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MENACING SPEECH AND THE FIRST
AMENDMENT: A FUNCTIONAL APPROACH TO
INCITEMENT THAT THREATENS
John Rothchild*
Constitutional rules of protection cannot be based on purely for-
mal distinctions among modes of utterance that are inattentive to
the way the communications actually function. ..
I. Introduction
The two-level approach2 to evaluating restrictions on speech for con-
sistency with the First Amendment depends crucially on whether the
speech is characterized as belonging to a category of constitutionally disfa-
vored speech. Since courts rarely uphold content-based restrictions on
speech that receives undiluted First Amendment protection, but usually do
approve such restrictions on constitutionally disfavored speech, the deter-
mination whether a particular statement fits into one of the disfavored cate-
gories is generally outcome determinative.
But some speech is resistant to categorization using this approach.
One difficulty arises when a statement is expressed in the form associated
with one category of speech, but functions like speech belonging to another
category. This article addresses one variety of such cross-category speech,
namely advocacy of illegal action that functions as a threat. Its principal
argument is that certain types of advocacy speech should be analyzed ac-
cording to the criteria that are normally applicable to threats, with the result
that some speech that is currently considered protected would be found
unprotected. Because this new rule is more likely to have practical conse-
* Victor Kramer Fellow, University of Chicago Law School. I received helpful
comments on an earlier version of this article from Dan Burk, Joan Hartman, Doug
Lichtman, Geoffrey Stone, and David Strauss.
1. Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 Nw. U.L. Rv.
1081, 1095 (1983).
2. See Harry Kalven, Jr., The Metaphysics of the Law of Obscenity, 1960 Sup. CT.
REv. 1, 10-11.
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quences when applied to speech communicated via the Internet than when
applied to speech communicated through the older media, the proposal
may be viewed as an example of a disparate-impact approach to fashioning
new rules to govern online speech.
II. First Amendment Status of Harmful Speech
Consider the following hypothetical situation. Larry, a dedicated
animal rights activist, believes that killing animals is wrong. Larry sets up
a Web site, on which he displays the slogans "Carnivorism is murder,"
"Shut down the death camps," and "Animals are people too." The Web
site also states: "Stand up for the rights of defenseless animals! Shoot all
CEOs of meat-packing companies." Larry's Web site expresses the view
that those killings would be justifiable homicide, not murder, since they
would prevent the deaths of countless animals. The Web site also includes
a list of several dozen meat-packing CEOs, including their pictures, their
home and work addresses, a description of their cars, and information
about members of their family. Several of the CEOs listed on Larry's Web
site have been killed or wounded by animal rights vigilantes. May the
government compel Larry to take down the Web site, or penalize him for
the speech it contains, without infringing Larry's First Amendment rights?
In general, the First Amendment prohibits the government from im-
posing content-based restrictions on speech, absent a compelling govern-
ment interest that cannot be promoted through any less restrictive
alternative;3 this is referred to as the "strict scrutiny" test. Certain catego-
ries of speech, however, due to their "low value"' and propensity to bring
about serious harms, are treated differently. Some types of speech, such as
obscenity,5 child pornography,6 fighting words,7 false advertising,8 speech
proposing an illegal transaction,9 and perjury,10 are deemed outside the
3. See Sable Communications v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) ("The Government
may ... regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to promote a
compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the articulated
interest.").
4. See CASs R. SuNsTEIN, DEMOCRACY AND THE PROBLEM OF FREE SPEEci 8-11
(1993).
5. See Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957).
6. See New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982).
7. See Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
8. See In re R.M.J., 455 U.S. 191, 203 (1982).
9. See Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, 455 U.S. 489 (1982).
10. See United States v. Masters, 484 F.2d 1251, 1254 (10th Cir. 1973).
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protections of the First Amendment. The government may restrict or ban
those types of speech without raising constitutional issues."
Restrictions on other categories of speech, such as defamation 2 and
commercial speech,' 3 are not excluded from First Amendment review, but
strict scrutiny is not applied. Thus, a restriction on commercial speech is
valid if there is a reasonable "fit" between the restriction and the further-
ance of a substantial government interest,' 4 and whether a speaker may be
held liable for a defamatory statement depends on such factors as the
speaker's state of mind and the plaintiff's status.' 5
As to speech falling within all of these categories, the Supreme Court
engages in "definitional balancing" rather than the "ad hoc balancing" that
strict scrutiny demands. 6 Definitional, or categorical, balancing involves
designating a particular category of speech, based on either the subject
matter of the speech or the setting in which it occurs, for special treatment:
restrictions on speech falling into such a category are evaluated through a
standard other than strict scrutiny.' 7 This categorical approach usually re-
sults in reduced protection for speech.'" Thus, in deciding to apply defini-
tional balancing to child pornography, the Court noted:
[I]t is not rare that a content-based classification of speech has
been accepted because it may be appropriately generalized that
within the confines of the given classification, the evil to be re-
stricted so overwhelmingly outweighs the expressive interests, if
11. The First Amendment may, however, forbid restrictions based on the viewpoint that
speech promotes or the subject matter that it addresses, even as to speech falling within
these low-value categories. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 (1992).
12. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964). Defamatory speech is
itself divided into sub-categories for First Amendment purposes. Defamation directed at
public figures may be restricted only on a showing that the speaker acted with "actual
malice," while defamation of a person who is not a public figure may be penalized as long
as the speaker is at least negligent. See also Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323
(1974).
13. See Central Hudson Gas v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 447 U.S. 557, 563 (1980).
14. See Board of Trustees of SUNY v. Fox, 492 U.S. 469 (1989).
15. See Sullivan, 376 U.S. at 287.
16. See Jeffrey M. Shaman, The Theory of Low-Value Speech, 48 SMU L. REv. 297,
330-32 (1995).
17. See RODNEY A. SMoLLA, SMoiLA AND NInAER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.4
(Supp. 1998); David Crump, Camouflaged Incitement: Freedom of Speech, Communicative
Torts, and the Borderland of the Brandenburg Test, 29 GA. L. REv. 1, 45-48 (1994).
18. See Shaman, supra note 16, at 331. For an argument that the categorical treatment
of speech is ill-conceived, see Eric M. Freedman, A Lot More Comes Into Focus When You
Remove the Lens Cap: Why Proliferating New Communications Technologies Make It Par-
ticularly Urgent for the Supreme Court to Abandon Its Inside-Out Approach to Freedom of
Speech and Bring Obscenity, Fighting Words, and Group Libel Within the First Amend-
ment, 81 IowA L. REv. 883 (1996).
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any, at stake, that no process of case-by-case adjudication is
required.' 9
Two additional categories of speech that are subject to definitional
balancing are most relevant in the present context: advocacy of illegal ac-
tion, and threats of violence.
A. Advocacy of Illegal Action
The current First Amendment analysis of advocacy of illegal action
derives from cases challenging convictions under the Espionage Act of
1917,20 which outlawed a broad range of activities deemed to interfere
with the war effort. In Schenck v. United States,2 the Court first set forth
the "clear and present danger" test, which allows the government to restrict
speech if "the words used are used in such circumstances and are of such a
nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the
substantive evils that Congress has a right to prevent."22 Subsequent cases
under the Espionage Act, as well as prosecutions brought under the Smith
Act,23 a law making it illegal to advocate overthrow of the government,
modified the "clear and present danger" test in several stages.24
In Brandenburg v. Ohio,25 the Court reformulated the "clear and pres-
ent danger" test into its present form. In Brandenburg, a Ku Klux Klan
leader challenged his conviction under the Ohio Criminal Syndicalism Act
for making the statement, "We're not a revengent organization, but if our
President, our Congress, our Supreme Court, continues to suppress the
white, Caucasian race, it's possible that there might have to be some
revengeance taken."26 Reversing the conviction, the Court held that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."'27 Branden-
burg thus holds that the First Amendment allows the government to pro-
hibit advocacy of illegal conduct if (1) it is "directed to" inciting others to
engage in illegal conduct "imminently," and (2) it is likely to bring about
19. New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 763-64 (1982).
20. 40 Stat. 217 (1917).
21. 249 U.S. 47 (1919).
22. Id. at 52.
23. 54 Stat. 671.
24. See RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FREE SPEECH IN AN OPEN Soci=ry 95-116 (1992)
(describing the historical development of the "clear and present danger" test).
25. 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (per curiam).
26. Id. at 446.
27. Id. at 447.
[Vol. 8:207
Menacing Speech and the First Amendment
such conduct "imminently." The "directed to" language imports an intent
requirement: the speaker must intend to bring about the unlawful con-
duct.2" The "imminence" requirement receives a temporal interpretation.
That is, to satisfy the "imminence" requirement, harm must be likely to
result immediately after the incitement.29
Several considerations underlie Brandenburg's imminence require-
ment. First, this limitation on the government's power to suppress speech
is in keeping with the "marketplace of ideas" principle that counterspeech
is preferable to censorship.3" If speech is not likely to result in unlawful
conduct right away-in other words, if there is time for counterspeech-
then there is no basis for restricting the speaker's freedom to voice his
views. Second, the imminence criterion responds to a suspicion that the
government may seek to suppress speech for improper reasons.3' It is "an
attempt to ensure that the danger is in fact not speculative and that the
government's interest in preventing the violence is not pretextual."32
28. See Hess v. Indiana, 414 U.S. 105, 108-09 (1973) (per curiam). See also Martin H.
Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In Defense of Clear and
Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1178 n.88 (1982).
29. See Bernard Schwartz, Holmes Versus Hand: Clear and Present Danger or Advo-
cacy of Unlawful Action?, 1994 Sup. CT. Rv. 209, 240. It has been argued that in some
circumstances a probabilistic interpretation-under which the imminence criterion would
be satisfied if the unlawful action is likely to occur, even if it will not occur right away-
would be more sensible. See Redish, supra note 28, at 1180-81 ("[W]hat of the individual
who urges another, 'when your husband returns from Europe on the 11th of next month,
you should kill him.'?"); Crump, supra note 17, at 59-61.
30. See Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 503 (1951) ("[Sjpeech can rebut speech,
propaganda will answer propaganda .... ); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357, 377
(1927) (Brandeis, J., concurring) ("If there be time to expose through discussion the false-
hood and fallacies, to avert the evil by the process of education, the remedy to be applied is
more speech, not enforced silence."); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 339-40
(1974) ("However pernicious an opinion may seem, we depend for its correction not on the
conscience of judges and juries but on the competition of other ideas."); Holly Coates
Keehn, Terroristic Religious Speech: Giving the Devil the Benefit of the First Amendment
Free Exercise and Free Speech Clauses, 28 SnroN HALL L. Rav. 1230, 1251-52 (1998).
When the speech is communicated publicly, advocacy of future illegal conduct may give
authorities an opportunity to prevent the action from occurring. See Kent Greenawalt,
Speech and Crime, 1980 Am. BAR FNDTNr. Rss. J. 647, 758-59. For a criticism of the conse-
quentialist justification of the "more speech" principle, and an autonomy-based justification,
see David A. Strauss, Persuasion, Autonomy, and Freedom of Expression, 91 COLUM. L.
Rav. 334 (1991).
31. See Geoffrey R. Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. &
MARY L. REv. 189, 227-33 (1983).
32. Avital T. Zer-Ilan, Case Note, The First Amendment and Murder Manuals, 106
YALE L.J. 2697, 2700 (1997). For an argument that the primary object of First Amendment
law is the discovery of improper governmental motives, see Elena Kagan, Private Speech,
Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U.
Cur. L. REv. 413 (1996).
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B. Threats of Violence
Another category of speech that the First Amendment does not protect
consists of threats of violence. Various federal and state statutes make the
issuance of a threat a basis for civil liability or criminal prosecution. The
most general federal statute dealing with threats makes it a crime, punish-
able by fine or imprisonment, to transmit in commerce "any communica-
tion containing ... any threat to injure the person of another."33 Other
federal statutes are more specific-prohibiting, for example, threats of
force or violence against the president or vice president;34 judges and other
federal officials;35 IRS employees; 36 providers of abortion services;37 and
jurors.38 In addition, most states have laws that declare the making of
threats to be a criminal offense.39
The modem First Amendment analysis of threats derives from Watts
v. United States.n ° The defendant in that case was convicted under a fed-
eral statute that prohibits threatening the president.41 The defendant's con-
viction was predicated upon the following statement:
"They always holler at us to get an education. And now I have
already received my draft classification as 1-A and I have got to
report for my physical this Monday coming. I am not going. If
they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I want to get in my
sights is L.B.J." "They are not going to make me kill my black
brothers."42
The defendant made the statement at a rally on the Washington Monument
grounds, early in the United States' military involvement in Vietnam, in
response to a statement by somebody else at the rally that young people
should get more education before expressing their views about the war.
Reversing the decision of a split panel of the Court of Appeals,43 the
Supreme Court held that the defendant's speech could not serve as the
basis for his conviction. The opinion provides remarkably little guidance.
It says only that the constitutional free speech principle requires us to inter-
33. 18 U.S.C. § 875(c) (1994).
34. 18 U.S.C. § 871(a) (1994).
35. 18 U.S.C. § 115(a)(1)(B) (1994 & Supp. 1996).
36. 26 U.S.C. § 7212(a) (1994).
37. 18 U.S.C. § 248 (1994).
38. 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1994 & Supp. 1996).
39. See Keehn, supra note 30, at 1249.
40. 394 U.S. 705 (1969) (per curiam).
41. 18 U.S.C. § 871 (1994).
42. Watts, 394 U.S. at 706 (quoting an army investigator's testimony of defendant's
statements).
43. Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676 (D.C. Cir. 1968), rev'd, Watts v. United
States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
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pret the term "threat" in the anti-threat statute as being limited to threats
that are "true," and that the speech for which the defendant was convicted
is political hyperbole that does not meet this threshold. The Court in Watts
offers no further criteria by which to determine whether a threat is "true,"
and thus unprotected, nor has it since.' Further development of the First
Amendment law pertaining to threats has therefore been left to the lower
courts.
There is no canonical statement of the criteria for determining whether
a statement is a "true threat" for First Amendment purposes; various courts
of appeals have formulated the test in various ways. But the formulations,
with one exception,45 are mostly similar, and contain the following
elements:
Intentional speech. First, the speaker must have made the statement
intentionally, but specific intent is not required. That is, the speaker must
have intended to make the statement, but it is not necessary that she actu-
ally intended to carry out the threatened action," or even that she had the
capability to do so.47
Expression of intent to harm. Second, the statement must express an
intention to inflict harm upon another.48 In one typical formulation, the
test is "whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement
44. In R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992), the Court enumerated, in
passing, "the reasons why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment," namely:
"protecting individuals from the fear of violence, from the disruption that fear engenders,
and from the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." The Court offered no
further elaboration of the test for unprotected threats.
45. The Second Circuit applies a more stringent test: "So long as the threat on its face
and in the circumstances in which it is made is so unequivocal, unconditional, immediate
and specific as to the person threatened, as to convey a gravity of purpose and imminent
prospect of execution, the statute may properly be applied." United States v. Kelner, 534
F.2d 1020, 1027 (2d Cir. 1976).
46. See United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991) ("[Ilt is the making
of the threat that is prohibited without regard to the maker's subjective intention to carry out
the threat."); United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 707 (7th Cir. 1986) ("IT]he govern-
ment is not required to establish that the defendant actually intended to carry out the
threat.").
47. See United States v. Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 1986) ("[C]orroborating
evidence that the defendant had the ability to carry out the threat is not a requirement to
establish a 'true threat' .... "); United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265-66
n.3 (9th Cir. 1990) (intent requirement does not include "that [speaker] was able to carry out
his threat").
48. Under the statutes cited above, only threats to inflict bodily harm are actionable.
But the First Amendment leaves unprotected a broader range of threats, such as a threat to
reveal information that harms the victim-blackmail. See Rice v. Paladin Enterprises, Inc.,
128 F.3d 233, 244 (4th Cir. 1997) (referencing blackmail along with other forms of "speech
brigaded with action").
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would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the state-
ment as a serious expression of intent to harm or assault.'49 Whose inten-
tion must be expressed: must it be the speaker's own intention, or may it be
some third party's intention? The caselaw takes it for granted that it must
be the speaker's own intention.5 0 Indeed, as the test is formulated by the
courts of appeals, there seems no alternative-the speaker must be expres-
sing her own intention, as it is linguistically, logically, and psychologically
impossible to express somebody else's intention. It is possible for a group
of people to express their collective intention-"We've talked it over, and
have decided that we're going to do x"-but that is no more than an aggre-
gation of individual expressions of intent. It is also possible to make a
guess at what a third party intends-"I think that Frank intends to do x"-
or a prediction as to what a third party will do-"I think that Frank is going
to do x"-but neither of these is an expression of the third party's intent.
Serious expression. Third, the statement must be such that the maker
would reasonably foresee that those to whom it is communicated would
interpret it as a serious expression of an intention to inflict harm." The
purpose of this element is to distinguish threatening statements that cause
substantial harm-namely, those that a reasonable listener would take seri-
ously, and that are likely to reasonably instill fear in the target of the
threat-from those that should be understood as harmless hyperbole.
Some courts phrase this element of the test slightly differently, shifting the
inquiry to whether a reasonable recipient of the speech would interpret it as
a threat, rather than whether a reasonable person (such as the speaker)
49. United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990) (emphasis
added). See also United States v. Malik, 16 F.3d 45, 51 (2d Cir. 1994) ("'A threat is a
statement expressing an intention to inflict bodily harm to someone .... ') (quoting jury
instructions); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969) (holding that a threat
requires "a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm upon or to take the life
of [another]").
50. See United States v. Dinwiddie, 76 F.3d 913, 925 (8th Cir. 1996) (noting that crite-
ria for determining whether speech is a true threat include "whether the victim had reason to
believe that the maker of the threat had a propensity to engage in violence") (emphasis
added); cf. United States v. Kosma, 951 F.2d 549, 554 (3d Cir. 1991) (distinguishing
Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378 (1987), on the ground that "Kosma's letters implied
that Kosma himself would be the person who would kill the President, while McPherson's
statement merely expressed a desire that another person kill the President.").
51. See, e.g., United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486, 1491 (1st Cir. 1997) (holding that
the test for a "true threat" is "whether [the speaker] should have reasonably foreseen that the
statement he uttered would be taken as a threat by those to whom it is made"); Roy v.
United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877 (9th Cir. 1969) ("[A] reasonable person would foresee that
the statement would be interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the state-
ment as a serious expression of an intention to inflict bodily harm.").
[Vol. 8:207214
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would foresee that the recipient would interpret the speech as a threat.52
Despite the difference in focus, each of these formulations states an objec-
tive standard (how a reasonable person would interpret the speech) rather
than a subjective one (how a particular person actually interpreted it), and
it is hard to see any practical differences between them.53
Contextual consideration. Finally, the statement is to be interpreted
in light of the context in which it is made.54 A statement that is perfectly
innocent in one context may connote a threat in another.55 Contextual fac-
tors include "the identities of the speakers and listeners, the current and
historical relationship between the parties, the place in which the commu-
nication is made, and the method or mode of communication," 56 as well as
the social, political, and cultural contexts. Also relevant is the subjective
factor of whether those who hear the speech actually interpret it as a seri-
ous threat.5 7 Therefore, the subjective reactions of listeners may be a fac-
tor in establishing whether the speech was objectively a serious threat.
The First Amendment analysis of threats responds to the nature of the
harms that true threats typically cause, and the mechanism by which such
harms are inflicted. 8 Threatening speech is outside the protection of the
52. See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1984) ("'The ques-
tion is whether those who hear or read the threat reasonably consider that an actual threat
has been made."') (quoting United States v. Dysart, 705 F.2d 1247, 1256 (10th Cir. 1983));
United States v. Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356, 1358 (4th Cir. 1973) (noting that whether an
"ordinary, reasonable recipient who is familiar with the context of the [statement] would
interpret it as a threat of injury is a relevant issue").
53. See Criminal Law-First Amendment-First Circuit Defines Threat in the Context
of Federal Threat Statutes-United States v. Fulmer, 108 F.3d 1486 (Casenote), 111 HARV.
L. REv. 1110, 1112-13 (1998).
54. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (considering the
political context in holding that an offensive statement regarding political opposition to the
president was not a true threat); United States v. Bellrichard, 994 F.2d 1318, 1321 (8th Cir.
1993); United States v. Khorrami, 895 F.2d 1186, 1193 (7th Cir. 1990).
55. See Watts v. United States, 402 F.2d 676, 681 (D.C. Cir. 1968) ("[The words 'I
will see you in the street at sundown' meant, in certain times and places, a challenge to a
shooting."), rev'd, Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705 (1969).
56. John T. Nockleby, Hate Speech in Context: The Case of Verbal Threats, 42 BUFF.
L. REv. 653, 659-60 (1994).
57. See United States v. J.H.H., 22 F.3d 821, 827 (8th Cir. 1994) ("Evidence showing
the reaction of the victim of a threat is admissible as proof that a threat was made."); United
States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) ("The reaction of the recipients is
probative-the three judges who testified took extra security measures.").
58. This article considers only unconditional threats of violence, in which the threatener
states her intention to inflict unjustified bodily injury on another. A conditional threat takes
the form: "Unless you do p, I will do q.", where p is something that the threatener wants and
q is something that the threatened person does not want and from which the threatened
person has a right to be safe. The unprotected status of a conditional threat may be justified
on the ground that it coercively interferes with the threatened person's autonomy, and there-
216 Texas Journal of Women and the Law [Vol. 8:207
First Amendment in view of the harms it inflicts, as weighed against the
interests it advances.
Two types of harm are associated with threatening speech. The first is
the inducement of a state of fear or emotional disturbance in the threatened
person.
The fear that threats of violence create in their auditors can be
great .... It is also frequently difficult-particularly with anony-
mous threats-to determine the likelihood that the speaker will
attempt to carry out the threat. The resulting uncertainty, cou-
pled with knowledge that one cannot protect oneself at all times,
can lead to extreme stress.5 9
The second type of harm involves the diversion of resources and disruption
that accompany defensive efforts aimed at preventing the carrying out of
the threat.60 "[Slerious threats, especially those directed at highly promi-
nent public persons, may call forth extensive social resources to prevent
their fulfillment, and may inhibit the activities of those subject to the
threats.'
These harms arise directly from the mere perception of what seems to
be a serious threat. That is why a threat may be unprotected even if it is
not communicated to the target.62 Even if the target is unaware of the
fore does not advance but rather interferes with the accomplishment of the First Amend-
ment value of individual self-fulfillment. See C. Edwin Baker, Scope of the First
Amendment Freedom of Speech, 25 UCLA L. REv. 964, 997-1003 (1978). Conditional
threats that are manipulative may be viewed as "situation-altering utterances" that are "ways
of doing things, not of asserting things," and therefore "generally subject to regulation on
the same bases as most noncommunicative behavior." KENT GREENAWALT, SPEECH,
CRIME, AND m UsEs OF LANGUAGE 58, 66-68 (1989). More pragmatically, a conditional
threat may give rise to the same harms as unconditional threats-fear and disruption-and
may in addition coerce the target so as to alter her behavior in ways that do not serve her
own interests. See, e.g., United States v. Whiffen, 121 F.3d 18, 20 (1st Cir. 1997) (defend-
ant's statement to collection agency that "the building will go boom" caused agency not to
pursue collection activities).
59. Nockleby, supra note 56, at 663.
60. See R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 388 (1992). The Court goes on to
enumerate a third reason why threats of violence are outside the First Amendment: "protect-
ing individuals from ... the possibility that the threatened violence will occur." Id. But it
is not obvious how the expression of a threat makes its commission more likely. There
seems little reason to expect that the expression of a threat makes it more likely that the one
who expresses it will carry it out; or, conversely, that if one is forbidden to issue a threat,
but must harbor his animus in silence, he will be less likely to act on it.
61. Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion, supra note 1, at 1105.
62. See United States v. Martin, 163 F.3d 1212, 1216 (10th Cir. 1998) (threat against
police detective communicated to defendant's compatriot); United States v. Shoulberg, 895
F.2d 882, 884 (2d Cir. 1990) (threat against co-defendant communicated to other co-defend-
ant); United States v. Crews, 781 F.2d 826, 829 (10th Cir. 1986) (threat against the presi-
dent made to a psychiatric nurse).
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threat, the making of the threat may give rise to efforts by law enforcement
officials and others to defend against the threat. This effect is most pro-
nounced where the target is a public official.63 It also explains why there is
no requirement that the threatener intend to carry out the threat. "The
threat alone is disruptive of the recipient's sense of personal safety and
well-being and is the true gravamen of the offense."'
C. Analysis of the Hypothetical
Let us now return to the hypothetical posed above. This situation
seems to involve advocacy of illegal action. Larry is trying to incite his
audience, through language displayed on his Web site, to kill the CEOs of
meat-packing companies, and killing (except in unusual circumstances not
present here) is certainly illegal. Is this unprotected speech, under the
Brandenburg analysis? Probably not. Recall that for advocacy of illegal
action to lose its First Amendment protection, it must be aimed at motivat-
ing others to engage in "imminent" illegal conduct, and it must be likely to
result in such conduct. The speech in our hypothetical probably does not
satisfy this latter requirement, for the simple reason that a visitor to Larry's
Web site is unlikely to be in the immediate presence of the targets of
Larry's invective at the time he accesses the site. He is likely to be sitting
in front of his computer at his home or office, at some remove from the
CEOs.65 There will be some substantial interval between the time a person
views Larry's message, and the time when he is able to act on an inclina-
tion to kill the CEOs. During that interval, he will have time to reflect on
what he is doing, and perhaps to seek the views of others as to the appro-
priateness of yielding to Larry's exhortations. It is the theory of the First
Amendment that the existence of this possibility for reflection renders
Larry's speech sufficiently less dangerous that the government may not
restrict his speech.66
If Larry's speech is not unprotected advocacy of illegal action, per-
haps it is an unprotected threat. To qualify as a threat under the test that
63. One purpose of 18 U.S.C. § 871, which prohibits threats against the president, is to
prevent "the detrimental effect upon Presidential activity and movement that may result
simply from a threat upon the President's life." Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874, 877
(9th Cir. 1969).
64. United States v. Manning, 923 F.2d 83, 86 (8th Cir. 1991). See Rogers v. United
States, 422 U.S. 35, 46-47 (1975) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("[Threats may be costly and
dangerous to society in a variety of ways, even when their authors have no intention
whatever of carrying them out.").
65. Conversely, those who live or work in immediate proximity to the CEOs-consist-
ing of their employees, friends, and family-are unlikely to find Larry's message
persuasive.
66. See Strauss, supra note 30, at 338-39.
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the courts of appeals have fashioned, 67 the speech must express the
speaker's intention to inflict bodily harm on another. But Larry's speech is
not of this sort: he does not state, expressly or by implication, that he in-
tends to take action against the CEOs. To the contrary, Larry's Web site
makes him look a bit like a hypocrite. He urges others to engage in homi-
cide, rather than doing the deed himself. If he had any intention of killing
the CEOs himself, he would most likely not be broadcasting his intentions
but would instead be stealthily hatching a plan to plant a bomb at a meat-
packers' convention. Therefore, Larry's speech is not a threat, let alone an
unprotected one.
Though Larry's speech does not meet the Brandenburg test for unpro-
tected advocacy of illegal action or the lower courts' formulation of the test
for a true threat, I will argue that speech of this sort should nevertheless be
held unprotected through application of the First Amendment principles
that lie behind the unprotected status of threats. To make this argument, I
will shift from the hypothetical to the real-world situation on which it is
based.
III. Advocacy of Violence Against Abortion Providers
In Planned Parenthood v. American Coalition of Life Activists,68 the
plaintiffs, doctors who perform abortions and two clinics that offer abor-
tions and other reproductive health care services, sued a group of anti-
abortion activists who had engaged in a campaign of vehement harassment
of abortion providers. The speech in question consisted of two posters and
a collection of dossiers on abortion providers that was later posted on a
Web site called the Nuremberg Files.69 The posters, which defendants
presented at a press conference, proclaim that abortion providers are
"GUILTY of Crimes Against Humanity," and liken abortion to the "war
crime[s]" that were prosecuted during the Nuremberg Trials in 1945-46.
One of the posters lists, under the heading "THE DEADLY DOZEN," the
names, addresses, and telephone numbers of twelve people, including three
of the plaintiffs.7" The other poster describes one of the plaintiffs as a
67. See supra text accompanying notes 41-57.
68. 23 F. Supp. 2d 1182 (D. Or. 1998). The award of damages in this case resulted
from a jury verdict, rendered on February 2, 1999, that is not reflected in any published
judicial decision. Before sending this case to the jury, the district court ruled on the First
Amendment issues. See id. and 945 F. Supp. 1355 (D. Or. 1996).
69. See Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1186. Plaintiffs based their allegations
on a fourth item as well: a bumper sticker reading "EXECUTE Murderers/Abortionists."
The court granted defendants summary judgment as to the claims based on the bumper
sticker, finding that the evidence would not support a finding that the bumper sticker
amounted to an unprotected "true threat." Id. at 1194.
70. Id. at 1186.
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"notorious Kansas City abortionist [who] travels to St. Louis weekly to kill
babies at Reproductive Health Services ***. He also sometimes kills wo-
men." The poster features a photograph of the plaintiff and his home and
work addresses.72
The Nuremberg Files initially consisted of a box of hard-copy files
containing personal identifying information about doctors who perform
abortions. Defendants displayed these files at an anti-abortion event, and
later created a Web site with the same name.73 The site stated that defend-
ant ACLA "is cooperating in collecting dossiers on abortionists in anticipa-
tion that one day we may be able to hold them on trial for crimes against
humanity," referencing the Nuremberg Trials as a historical antecedent. It
continued: "We anticipate the day when these people will be charged in
PERFECTLY LEGAL COURTS once the tide of the nation's opinion
turns against child-killing (as it surely will)." The site contained the names
of about 200 people who were labeled "abortionists," as well as names of
more than 200 others, including clinic workers, judges, politicians, and law
enforcement officers, who were characterized as "their weapons bearers,"
"their shysters," "their mouthpieces," and "their bloodhounds. 74
Most chillingly, the Web site indicated the current status of each of
the "abortionists" it named. As explained by a legend on the site, names of
those who were "working" appeared in black letters, those who had been
"wounded" by anti-abortion fanatics were shown in grey, and those who
had been killed for providing abortion services-designated as "fatality"-
had their names crossed out.7 5 The status indicators were updated regu-
larly; when Dr. Barnett Slepian was murdered, the Web site was updated
within several hours of his death.76 Some of the defendants indicated their
approval of the murder of abortion providers in other ways as well. In the
midst of a series of violent attacks against abortion providers, one defend-
ant publicly stated: "More violence is inevitable, and it is righteous. *** It
wouldn't bother me if every abortionist in the country today fell dead from
a bullet."77 Defendants also "held a 'White Rose Banquet,' at which they
71. Id. at 1187 (alterations in original).
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. Id. at 1188. The Nuremberg Files Web site was taken down shortly after the jury
verdict. A mirrored version of the site was available at this writing. See The Nuremberg
Files (last modified March 19, 1999) <http://www.netfreedom.net>.
75. See Neal Horsley, Alleged Abortionists and Their Accomplices (last modified March
12, 1999) <http://www.netfreedom.net/nuremberg/aborts.html>.
76. See Gloria Feldt, Oregon Jury Strikes Blow Against Anti-Choice Terrorism, Planned
Parenthood Press Release Archive (Feb. 2, 1999) <http://www.plannedparenthood.org/
pressreleases/12999-ACLAwin.html>.
77. Planned Parenthood, 945 F. Supp. at 1362 (alteration in original).
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honored individuals who were incarcerated for committing anti-abortion
violence."
78
The defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing, among other
things, that their speech was protected by the First Amendment. The court
denied the motion with respect to the posters and Web site,79 holding that
the statements were "true threats" under the Ninth Circuit's version of the
Watts test and therefore unprotected. The court acknowledged that "the
statements at issue do not contain any expressly or apparently threatening
language."8 Nevertheless, it found that the statements met the "true
threat" criterion when viewed "'in light of their entire factual context.' ,81
The relevant contextual factors were (1) the climate of escalating violence
against abortion providers, including several murders, that had been ongo-
ing for several years, and (2) the reaction of those to whom the statements
were conveyed.8 2 Once the court rejected the defendants' First Amend-
ment challenge, the case went to the jury, which awarded $107 million in
compensatory and punitive damages.
83
I believe that the district court erred in finding that the speech at issue
constituted "true threats" under existing caselaw. Like Larry's animal-
rights Web site in our hypothetical, the statements were not "threats" at all,
because none of the statements conveyed any intention, either seriously or
hyperbolically expressed, on the part of the makers of the statements to
inflict bodily harm upon the plaintiffs. Under the circumstances, it was
certainly reasonable for the plaintiffs to fear that they might become vic-
tims of violence. But this fear did not arise from any threats made by the
defendants-it instead arose from the justifiable concern that defendants'
expressions of approval of murder would incite others to violent actions
against plaintiffs.
A statement need not, of course, be expressed in the canonically
threatening form-"I am going to harm you"-to constitute a threat. Thus,
a statement that has irrational elements may still be a threat, since "poten-
tial assassins may well be irrational."84 In addition, a statement that is
78. Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1187.
79. The court granted summary judgment for defendants as to the bumper sticker. See
id. at 1194.
80. Id. at 1193-94.
81. Id. at 1194 (quoting Lovell v. Poway Unified Sch. Dist., 90 F.3d 367, 372 (9th Cir.
1996)).
82. See id. at 1186, 1189. In this case, the FBI offered around-the-clock federal marshal
protection for abortion providers named in the posters, the individual plaintiffs began wear-
ing bullet-proof vests, and the plaintiff clinics increased their security measures.
83. See Sam Howe Verhovek, Creators of Anti-Abortion Web Site Told to Pay Millions,
N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 3, 1999, at A9.
84. United States v. Mitchell, 812 F.2d 1250, 1256 (9th Cir. 1987).
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ambiguous on its own may become clearly threatening when combined
with other statements. For example, the statements "you have only one
chance" and "Please Maurie, make it easy on yourself by cooperating
fully," standing alone, are ambiguous at best, but when joined with the
statement "We want $10,000.00 cash in 10's and 20's ... ,"5 the meaning
becomes clear. Such coy phraseology falls short of stating explicitly that
the threatener will take some action, but leaves no doubt that the threat, if
any, will be carried out by the threatener. In Planned Parenthood, how-
ever, the makers of the statements do not suggest, or even imply, that they
will themselves carry out acts of violence.
To see why the defendants' statements in Planned Parenthood do not
qualify as "true threats" under current law, it is instructive to compare the
case with another case involving similar facts but with a crucial difference.
In United States v. Khorrami,6 the defendant was convicted for making
threatening telephone calls and sending threatening communications by
mail to the New York headquarters of the Jewish National Fund (JNF). In
telephone calls made over the course of six months, the defendant "stated
'death to' Jews, various individuals, and the Jewish National Fund," and
"spewed forth other vicious, degrading and random insults including state-
ments that 'Jews are scum,' as well as profane statements such as 'Fuck all
Jews."' 87 The first mailing, which was sent in a JNF business-reply envel-
ope, consisted of "a poster-like paper that stated at its top 'Wanted for
crimes against humanity and Palestinians for fifty years."' The poster con-
tained pictures of Israeli leaders and officials of the JNF, inscribed with the
statements "Execute now!," "His blood need," and "Must be killed."8" The
second mailing contained a JNF calendar, which was defaced with swasti-
kas and statements similar to the "death to" language of the telephone
calls.89
The defendant appealed his conviction, arguing, among other things,
that the "Wanted" poster "was merely 'political hyperbole' and could not
have been interpreted by a reasonable jury as containing 'true threats.' "90
The court rejected this argument. Instead, it held that given the context in
which the poster was sent, including (1) the threatening telephone calls, (2)
the threats contained on the defaced calendar, and (3) defendant's use of
JNF materials to convey the mailings, indicating he had had prior contact
85. United States v. Prochaska, 222 F.2d 1, 2 (7th Cir. 1955).
86. 895 F.2d 1186 (7th Cir. 1990).
87. Id. at 1188.
88. Id. at 1189.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1193.
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with the JNF, a reasonable jury could find that the "Wanted" poster consti-
tuted a "true threat."91
The "Wanted" poster that served as a basis of Khorrami's conviction
bears a striking resemblance to the posters at issue in Planned Parenthood.
The posters in both cases used the "Wanted" format to suggest that the
targets of the posters were lawbreakers; both named specific individuals;
and neither expressly stated that the maker of the communication intended
to inflict harm on the recipients. But the differences between the two sets
of facts are crucial. First, Khorrami had directed threats at the recipients
through other means (the telephone calls and defaced calendar). Since
these threats were expressions of his own intent, the court could reasonably
interpret the poster likewise as an expression of the defendant's own intent
to harm the recipients. Second, the fact that Khorrami mailed the poster
directly to the targets, rather than making the same statements in a public,
political context,92 led the recipients to interpret the poster as an expression
of Khorrami's own intent, rather than as an effort to convey ideas through
"political hyperbole." 93
By contrast, nothing about the context presented in Planned
Parenthood would lead the recipients of the speech at issue to interpret it
as an expression of the intention of the makers of the communication to
inflict bodily harm. The context that the court relied upon-the climate of
escalating violence directed against providers of abortion services 9a -
shows that plaintiffs reasonably felt threatened, but that context has noth-
ing to do with whether defendants expressed a threat. The court conflated
two connotations of the word "threat": it allowed the jury to infer, from the
clearly established facts that (1) the plaintiffs felt "threatened" as a result of
defendants' speech, and (2) defendants intended for plaintiffs to feel
"threatened," that the speech consisted of threats. But this is a non se-
quitur-the fact that one feels "threatened," in the ordinary sense, does not
imply that one has been subjected to a threat. One may feel threatened by
circumstances that do not involve speech of any sort. Likewise, one may
instill fear in others through speech that does not contain threats.
91. Id.
92. See United States v. Daughenbaugh, 49 F.3d 171, 174 (5th Cir. 1995) (distinguish-
ing Watts on grounds that "it involved a public rally, not a private letter"); United States v.
Welch, 745 F.2d 614, 618 (10th Cir. 1984) (finding the fact that defendant's statements
"were not made at a political rally or political meeting or during a political discussion"
supports finding of "true threat").
93. See Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 708 (1969) (per curiam) (holding that
mere political hyperbole is not a "true threat").
94. See Planned Parenthood, 23 F. Supp. 2d at 1188.
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Thus, under current law, the defendants' statements in Planned
Parenthood were not unprotected threats. In addition, it seems likely, as in
the hypothetical involving Larry and the meat-packers, that these state-
ments, while constituting advocacy of illegal action,95 are not unprotected
advocacy under the Brandenburg criterion, because the posters and Web
site are unlikely to bring about unlawful conduct imminently. There is no
reason to think that a person who sees the poster or Web site is likely, then
and there, to commit an act of violence against an abortion provider, if for
no other reason than that there is unlikely to be such a person in immediate
proximity.96 Application of existing First Amendment law thus leads to
the conclusion that the government may not prevent people from posting
on the Internet speech that likens abortion providers to Nazi mass murder-
ers, expresses approval of the murder of abortion providers, and offers per-
sonally identifying information that would be helpful to one who decides to
engage in violence against abortion providers.
This is a troubling result. The effect of defendants' speech was to
make plaintiffs reasonably fear that they would be the target of violent
attacks, and to disrupt their activities by forcing them to put security meas-
ures in place. In other words, defendants' speech resulted in the harms
usually associated with threats,9 7 even though it took the form of advocacy
of illegal action. Speech of this sort-I will call it "menacing speech"-
falls between the cracks of present First Amendment doctrine: it is not an
unprotected threat, because there is no threat involved, and it is not unpro-
tected advocacy of illegal action, because illegal action is not imminent.
Thus, if menacing speech is to be considered unprotected, it will be neces-
sary either to create a new category of speech that is analyzed through
categorical balancing, or to enlarge an existing category to include menac-
ing speech.
95. The advocacy here was not explicit, but "camouflaged." See Crump, supra note 17.
It consisted of (1) equating abortion providers with Nazi mass murderers, (2) expressing
approval of violence directed against abortion providers, through maintaining a scorecard of
who had been injured or killed, and (3) supplying names and other personal information
about abortion providers, which would facilitate targeting them for violence.
96. If the imminence requirement is interpreted as importing predictability or
probability, rather than temporal proximity, see Redish, supra note 28, at 1180-81; Crump,
supra note 17, at 59-61, the speech might be found unprotected. Additionally, it might be
different if the context were different-for example, if the same statements were made
before an angry armed mob stationed outside an abortion clinic. Cf JoHm STUART MtL,
ON LIBERTY 67-68 (Prentice-Hall 1956) (1859) ("An opinion that corn dealers are starvers
of the poor.., ought to be unmolested when simply circulated through the press, but may
justly incur punishment when delivered orally to an excited mob assembled before the
house of a corn dealer .... ").
97. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
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My thesis, then, is that First Amendment principles require that
speech that results in the harms usually associated with threats, and that
brings about those harms through the mechanism usually associated with
threats,9 8 should be subject to restrictions under the same standards that
apply to threats, even though the speech takes the form of advocacy of
violence. This result is consistent with both Brandenburg and Watts. The
following section justifies and elaborates this thesis.
IV. Justification for Treating Menacing Speech Like Threatening
Speech
Removing First Amendment protection from menacing speech is con-
sistent with the principles underlying the unprotected status of threats and
other low-value speech.
A. Criteria for Finding Speech Subject to Categorical Balancing
Although the Supreme Court has not clearly articulated the basis for
its determination that certain categories of speech should be relegated to
unprotected status, 99 the central elements of the methodology may be de-
duced from the caselaw. The Court's approach is to weigh the harms
brought about by a particular category of speech against its value, taking
into account the mechanism by which the harms are produced. The Court
also considers the risk that restricting such speech will result in chilling
protected speech.
1. Balancing harms against value
The balancing of harms against value is implicit in the Supreme
Court's oft-quoted recitation from Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire:' °a
There are certain well-defined and narrowly limited classes of
speech, the prevention and punishment of which have never been
thought to raise any Constitutional problem. These include the
lewd and obscene, the profane, the libelous, and the insulting or
"fighting" words-those which by their very utterance inflict in-
jury or tend to incite an immediate breach of the peace. It has
been well observed that such utterances are no essential part of
any exposition of ideas, and are of such slight social value as a
98. The several mechanisms by which speech may bring about harm are discussed infra
in the text accompanying notes 121-27.
99. See SuNsTEiN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 11, 125; Stone, Content Regulation,
supra note 31, at 194.
100. 315 U.S. 568 (1942).
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step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them is
clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality.1"'
This passage indicates that the disfavored status of low-value speech de-
rives from a finding that the elevated risk of harm that the speech presents
outweighs its minimal value.'0" The Supreme Court has applied this meth-
odology, with varying degrees of fidelity, 103 in several contexts, including
obscenity,"°  child pornography,105 and defamation. 10 6  Commentators
101. Id. at 571-72 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). This statement is not accurate as
a description of the current treatment of certain categories of speech: speech that is lewd
(but not obscene), profane, or libelous is not categorically excluded from constitutional
protection. See Shaman, supra note 16, at 303. However, the balancing approach that it
sets out retains currency.
102. See Shaman, supra note 16, at 302-03; Crump, supra note 17, at 48.
103. The Court's assignment of commercial speech to a middle rung in the constitutional
hierarchy of protected speech curiously departs from this approach. In holding that com-
mercial speech is entitled to First Amendment protection, the Court emphasized the high
value of such speech: a "consumer's interest in the free flow of commercial information...
may be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day's most urgent political
debate." Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc., 425
U.S. 748, 763 (1976). Although the Court later wavered on that point, see Ohralik v. Ohio
State Bar Ass'n, 436 U.S. 447, 456 (1978) (limited protection of commercial speech is
"commensurate with its subordinate position in the scale of First Amendment values"), it
more recently reaffirmed the high value of commercial speech, see City of Cincinnati v.
Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 418-19 (1993) (rejecting "the proposition that com-
mercial speech has only a low value"). The Court has referred to "[t]he interest in prevent-
ing commercial harms" as a justification for "more intensive regulation of commercial
speech than non-commercial speech," id. at 426 n.21, but it has relied more heavily on
another justification: that commercial speech is especially hardy, and not likely to be chilled
by regulation that may be overbroad. See Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977).
104. In Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973), the Court defined the category of ob-
scenity that is unprotected by the First Amendment as that which (1) causes harm by mak-
ing a "patently offensive" appeal to the prurient interest, and (2) "lacks serious.., value."
Id. at 24 (emphasis added). In Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476 (1957), the Court relied
on its characterization of obscenity as valueless--"utterly without redeeming social impor-
tance"-but declined to engage in an inquiry into the harms it causes. Id. at 484, 485-87.
105. In New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747 (1982), the Court held that the government
may prohibit the distribution of visual depictions of children engaging in sexual conduct
that do not meet the Miller definition of obscenity. In so doing, it relied upon (1) a finding
"that the use of children as subjects of pornographic materials is harmful to the physiologi-
cal, emotional, and mental health of the child," and (2) its assumption that "[tlhe value of
permitting live performances and photographic reproductions of children engaged in lewd
sexual conduct is exceedingly modest, if not de minimis." Id. at 758, 762.
106. In New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964), the Court held that the
First Amendment requires "a federal rule that prohibits a public official from recovering
damages for a defamatory falsehood relating to his official conduct unless he proves that the
statement was made with 'actual malice'-that is, with knowledge that it was false or with
reckless disregard of whether it was false or not." Id. at 279-80. The holding privileges
speech concerning the official conduct of public officials on the basis of the elevated value
of such speech. The Court quotes with approval from an opinion by the Supreme Court of
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have likewise invoked the same methodology in support of proposals to
allow the government greater leeway in regulating pornography10 7 and ra-
cist hate speech.' In fact, the Court weighs harms against value not only
in its categorical approach, but also in the ad hoc balancing that is entailed
by strict scrutiny. 0 9
To say that some speech is of low value is not to say that it has no
value at all. In particular, it is surely incorrect to say that threats of vio-
lence and advocacy of illegal action are utterly without value, for such
speech may serve several First Amendment values. It may: (1) communi-
cate ideas, (2) provide an emotional outlet, (3) express individual auton-
omy, and (4) enable listeners to offer counterspeech. Each value is
addressed in turn.
Communication of ideas. Threatening utterances and advocacy of il-
legal action powerfully convey the speaker's discontent. "[T]here is mar-
ketplace [of ideas] value in knowing that some members of the body politic
are so concerned about particular government practices that violence is
considered as an alternative."' ° In Watts, for example, the defendant's
threatening utterance-"If they ever make me carry a rifle the first man I
want to get in my sights is L.B.J." 1 '-was rather clearly intended as an
expression of his strong disapproval of the United States' involvement in
Kansas, which stated, with reference to discussions of the qualifications of candidates for
public office: "'The importance to the state and to society of such discussions is so vast, and
the advantages derived are so great, that they more than counterbalance the inconvenience
of private persons whose conduct may be involved .... ."' Id. at 281 (quoting Coleman v.
MacLennan, 98 P. 281 (Kan. 1908)). The Court addressed the harm side of the equation in
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 344-48 (1974), in which it declined to extend the
actual malice requirement to defamation of persons who are not public officials or public
figures. Its rationale, in part, was that defamation of private persons is more harmful than
defamation of public persons: "Public officials and public figures usually enjoy signifi-
cantly greater access to the channels of effective communication and hence have a more
realistic opportunity to counteract false statements than private individuals normally enjoy."
Id. at 344.
107. See Cass R. Sunstein, Pornography and the First Amendment, 1986 DuXE L.J. 589,
608.
108. See Richard Delgado, Words That Wound: A Tort Action for Racial Insults, Epi-
thets, and Name-Calling, 17 HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rv. 133, 172-79 (1982).
109. See Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 107, at 615 n.147 ("In every case ... the
court is implicitly or explicitly weighing a perceived state interest against the perceived
value of the speech involved.").
110. Steven Shiffrin, Defamatory Non-Media Speech and First Amendment Methodol-
ogy, 25 UCLA L. REv. 915, 949 (1978) (discussing speech that incites unlawful action).
See Kalven, supra note 2, at 11 ("If a man is seriously enough at odds with society to
advocate violent revolution, his speech has utility not because advocating revolution is use-
ful but because such serious criticism should be heard.").
111. Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 706 (1969) (per curiam).
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Vietnam.' 12 A blander statement, like "I oppose U.S. policy with respect
to Vietnam," would not carry the same meaning as the defendant's declara-
tion. Watts' statement, unlike the colorless version, vividly conveys his
view that by sending him off to kill Vietnamese, the president was alienat-
ing his own constituency." 3
Emotional outlet. Harmful speech may serve as a means of venting
one's emotions. Making a threat, expressing hate, or calling for illegal
action may be cathartic to the threatener, diverting the threatener's impetus
to carry out the threat. "[S]ometimes threats operate as a psychological
alternative to immediate physical assault.""' 4 Violent speech may bring
about palpable harms, but it is surely preferable to violent action.
Individual autonomy. Making threats and advocating illegal action
may be an expression of individual autonomy. "[T]here is independent
value in allowing people to explore all possibilities and to think through
the comparative advantages and disadvantages of various options." 115
Such exploration may be thought to "stimulate[ ] intellectual
development."" 6
Opportunity for counterspeech. Expression of harmful speech pro-
vides an opportunity for counterspeech. An example from the online me-
dium is presented by the Jake Baker case." 7 There the defendant was
indicted under a federal threats statute based on a story he posted to a
Usenet newsgroup, which "graphically described the torture, rape, and
112. Watts' statement might best be understood as a pure-speech analogue of flag-burn-
ing. See SuNsTEiN, DEmocRAcY, supra note 4, at 182 ("Flag-burning conveys the relevant
message more sharply and distinctively than anything else. If the speaker says instead, 'My
country is doing wrong,' the message will be so muted as to be fundamentally
transformed.").
113. This idea comes across more clearly in the version of Watts' statement offered by a
newspaper reporter: "* * * that he did not think that Negroes ought to serve in Vietnam to
shoot Vietnamese. He didn't think black men should look down the barrel of a rifle to kill
Vietnamese. He said that rather than looking down the barrel of a rifle to kill Vietnamese
people he would rather look down a rifle aimed at the President." Watts v. United States,
402 F.2d 676, 686 (D.C. Cir. 1968) (Wright, J., dissenting), rev'd, Watts v. United States,
394 U.S. 705 (1969).
114. GREENAwALT, SPEECH, CRimm, supra note 58, at 91; see also Shiffrin, supra note
110, at 949 ("There is cathartic value in having speakers who might otherwise become
dangerous release their tensions through verbal violence rather than physical violence.");
First Circuit Defines Threat, supra note 53, at 1114-15.
115. Martin H. Redish, Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct and the First Amendment: In
Defense of Clear and Present Danger, 70 CAL. L. REv. 1159, 1164 (1982).
116. Id.
117. United States v. Baker, 890 F. Supp. 1375 (E.D. Mich. 1995), aff'd on other
grounds, sub nom. United States v. Alkhabaz, 104 F.3d 1492 (6th Cir. 1997).
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murder of a woman who was given the name of a classmate of Baker's.'"'1
By publishing his odious fiction on Usenet, Baker invited others to post
their reactions. Many of his readers did just that, expressing their out-
rage. 19 This feedback may serve as a reality check to people, like Baker,
whose fantasies suggest mental imbalance. Counterspeech can help those
who hold fringe views to recognize their true position on the spectrum of
opinion. A prohibition against expression of pathological ideas eliminates
this avenue of feedback.
Threats and advocacy of illegal action therefore promote certain First
Amendment values. Occasional judicial statements to the contrary should
not be taken literally, but rather "as shorthand for a complex calculation
that the harms of such speech outweigh their contribution to the sphere of
expression."12 Accordingly, we cannot dismiss these utterances out of
hand as unworthy of constitutional protection. As with other categories of
low-value speech, we must engage in a balancing of value against harm.
2. Mechanism through which harm comes about
The mechanism through which the harm comes about is less often
discussed, but nevertheless underlies several distinctions that the Court has
made in its treatment of certain categories of speech. The relevant aspect
of the harm-producing mechanism is the directness with which harm fol-
lows speech. We may distinguish three such mechanisms, corresponding
to three degrees of directness: (1) the impact mechanism, (2) the believ-
ableness mechanism, and (3) the persuasion mechanism.
1 2'
The impact mechanism. In some cases, harm comes about upon a
recipient's mere perception of the speech. This is characteristic of obscen-
ity:122 the harms it causes result as soon as the recipient perceives it.123
118. Baker, 890 F. Supp. at 1379. The superseding indictment, under which Baker was
actually prosecuted, was not based on this story. Id.
119. See MIKE GODWIN, CYBER RIGHTs: DEFENDING FREE SPEECH IN THE DIGITAL AGE
120 (1998) ("[M]any readers of alt.sex.stories were appalled by Baker's fiction, and said so
publicly.").
120. Kagan, supra note 32, at 419.
121. For present purposes, we need not concern ourselves with two additional mecha-
nisms by which speech may bring about harm. Speech may cause harm through its direct
physical effects, such as by waking the sleeping or triggering an avalanche. Speech may
also cause harm by conveying information, such as how to make a bomb, that can be used
to accomplish some act that causes injury. See Thomas Scanlon, A Theory of Freedom of
Expression, 1 PHnosoPHY & PuB. AiF. 210-11 (1972). The former mechanism works more
directly than those discussed in text, while the latter works less directly.
122. See Sunstein, Pornography, supra note 107, at 595-602. Sunstein addresses por-
nography, which as he defines it is not co-extensive with the Supreme Court's definition of
obscenity. But his discussion of the harms resulting from pornography applies to many
types of obscenity as well.
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Perjury likewise belongs in this category because the administration of jus-
tice is disrupted the moment false testimony is given. We may also include
"fighting words," which trigger an immediate emotional response, as well
as ethnic slurs, profanity, blasphemy, and other "intrinsically offensive"
* speech. 124
The believableness mechanism. With other types of speech, another
step is required: harm arises only after the recipient perceives the speech
and processes it cognitively, arriving at a judgment as to whether it should
be credited. For example, a threat to commit bodily harm is usually 1" not
harmful merely upon being perceived; it only becomes harmful once the
recipient evaluates it in context and concludes that it is seriously in-
tended.'26 Likewise, a defamatory statement causes no harm if the recipi-
ent judges that it is not meant to be taken seriously or is fatuous. False
advertising might seem to be harmful only if it persuades a consumer to
make a purchase, but in fact it causes harm merely by being believable, 27
since any material misinformation in the marketplace interferes with the
operation of consumer sovereignty.
The persuasion mechanism. The least direct type of harm results only
if the speech proves persuasive. Advocacy of illegal action is usually of
this sort. The audience may perceive this speech as serious and may judge
123. It might even be said that obscenity consisting of visual depictions making use of
live actors and models, like child pornography, results in harm even before it is viewed,
through the coercion and brutalization of women who participate in producing pornography.
See id. at 595-97; New York v. Ferber, 458 U.S. 747, 758 (1982).
124. See Strauss, supra note 30, at 341-42 (discussing examples of "intrinsically offen-
sive" speech).
125. The qualification is in recognition of the possibility that a threat may provoke an
immediate violent reaction from the audience even if it is not believed to be serious. Con-
sider, for example, the statement "Step outside, if you're a man, so that I can beat you
senseless." The Supreme Court seems to acknowledge the possibility that a threat may
constitute "fighting words." In Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 573 (1942),
the Court quoted with approval from an opinion of the New Hampshire Supreme Court,
which enumerated "'profanity, obscenity and threats"' as among the types of speech that
"'have a direct tendency to cause acts of violence by the person to whom, individually, the
remark is addressed."'
126. See, e.g., United States v. Orozco-Santillan, 903 F.2d 1262, 1265 (9th Cir. 1990)
("[W]hether a particular statement may properly be considered a threat is governed by an
objective standard-whether a reasonable person would foresee that the statement would be
interpreted by those to whom the maker communicates the statement as a serious expression
of intent to harm or assault.").
127. False advertising may even harm consumers through its unbelievableness. See Rob-
ert Pitofsky, Beyond Nader: Consumer Protection and the Regulation of Advertising, 90
H v. L. REv. 661, 671 (1977) (arguing that rampant misinformation in the marketplace
may lead consumers to rely, to their detriment, on price as proxy for quality).
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that the speaker intends to be taken seriously; yet no harm arises unless the
speech persuades a listener to carry out the illegal action.
This dimension of harmful speech-the mechanism through which it
results in harm-explains why the imminence of harm is a factor in the
Brandenburg test for whether advocacy of illegal action is unprotected, but
is not a factor in the Watts test that applies to threats. Because advocacy of
illegal action normally works through the persuasion mechanism, it is dan-
gerous and therefore proscribable only if it is likely to be persuasive.
Threats, on the other hand, normally do their mischief through the believ-
ableness mechanism and are therefore unprotected as long as they are
likely to be taken seriously. The harm arising from threats may be viewed
as inherently imminent, since there is no need to wait for persuasion.
3. Risk of chilling protected speech
Treating a category of speech as unprotected may have the undesired
side effect of chilling protected speech. This chilling can happen if the
category is not sufficiently well defined, so that speakers are unsure
whether speech in which they propose to engage is within the unprotected
category. The concern with overbreadth is addressed in case-by-case eval-
uations of restrictions on speech. 128 The Supreme Court has also found it
applicable when establishing categorical treatment of a particular class of
speech. Thus, in holding that restrictions on commercial speech may be
sustained on a lesser showing than the generally applicable "compelling
government interest" test, the Court explained that commercial speech is
less likely to be chilled than other kinds of speech, because the motive to
engage in it, being pecuniary in nature, is especially strong, and because
commercial speakers are in a better position than others to be confident in
the truth of speech concerning their own wares.129
B. Application of the Criteria for Disfavored Categorical Treatment to
Menacing Speech
Application of these four criteria leads to the conclusion that menac-
ing speech should be designated as low-value speech and evaluated cate-
gorically, rather than being subject to the strict scrutiny test.
128. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853, 863-
67 (1991).
129. See Virginia State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, Inc.,
425 U.S. 748, 772 n.24 (1976); Bates v. State Bar, 433 U.S. 350, 380-81 (1977). The
validity of this justification is contestable. See, e.g., Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who's
Afraid of Commercial Speech?, 76 VA. L. Rv. 627, 634-38 (1990).
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1. Harm resulting from the speech
Considered from the standpoint of the harm it causes, menacing
speech is (by definition) the equivalent of a true threat: speech qualifies as
"menacing," as defined in this article, only if it brings about the harms
normally associated with threats. As discussed above, these harms are the
fear that the target experiences and the disruption caused by efforts to pre-
vent the carrying out of the threat. 130 Advocacy of violence, in the context
that is present in Planned Parenthood, may certainly cause a reasonable
target to be placed in fear and to have her routine disrupted.13'
2. Value of the speech
As discussed above, advocacy of illegal action may promote recog-
nized free speech values. It may convey ideas, serve as an emotional out-
let, promote autonomy, and facilitate counterspeech. 132 But there is no
reason to think that such speech has, on a categorical basis, any more value
by virtue of the fact that it is menacing. In other words, if advocacy of
violence that is likely to be persuasive is so little valued that it is subject to
disfavored categorical treatment, the same should be true of advocacy that
is menacing.
3. Mechanism by which harm results
Menacing speech differs from ordinary advocacy of illegal action in
that it brings about its harms through the mechanism of believableness,
rather than the mechanism of persuasion. That is, it causes harm through
the mechanism usually associated with threats. There is no opportunity for
counterspeech: the harm is done as soon as the target perceives the threat
and judges it to be serious. It thus seems justified to evaluate menacing
speech according to the standard that applies to threats (objective serious-
ness of the threat), rather than that which usually applies to advocacy (like-
lihood that illegal action will result imminently).
4. Danger of chilling protected speech
It will admittedly often be difficult to determine whether a particular
utterance qualifies as menacing-that is, whether advocacy of violence is
likely to bring about the harms usually associated with threats. But this
difficulty is equally present when applying the existing criteria for deter-
130. See supra text accompanying notes 59-61.
131. As one of the defendants testified at trial in the Planned Parenthood case: "If I was
an abortionist, I would be afraid." Nat Hentoff, When "Pro-Lifers" Threaten Lives, WASH.
PosT, Feb. 27, 1999, at A21.
132. See supra text accompanying notes 110-20.
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mining whether a threat is a "true threat," and whether advocacy of illegal
action is likely to result in such action imminently. The inquiry required to
determine whether a threat is serious or merely rhetorical is a highly con-
textual one, which the courts often have difficulty applying.133 Evaluating
menacing speech calls for applying the same test to statements with a dif-
ferent formal structure. In addition to evaluating the reasonable, contextu-
ally dependent signification of statements like, "I am going to kill you
meat-packing CEOs," a court would apply the same criteria to statements
like, "I urge all right-minded people to kill meat-packing CEOs."
C. Relation of the Proposed Rule to Current Doctrine
The proposed rule could be implemented through any of several dif-
ferent modifications of current doctrine. The most likely approaches are:
(1) designating menacing speech for disfavored categorical treatment, (2)
relaxing Brandenburg's "imminence" requirement, or (3) modifying the
"true threat" standard that the lower courts have derived from Watts.
1. Creating a new category of menacing speech
Menacing speech could be made unprotected by placing it within a
new category of disfavored low-value speech that is not subject to strict
scrutiny. As with obscenity, true threats, fighting words, and advocacy of
illegal action that meets the "imminence" test, the government could justify
a restriction on menacing speech simply by showing it falls within the cate-
gory so defined.
Although it may seem surprising, this shift may be accomplished
without disturbing Brandenburg. That case is sometimes viewed as stand-
ing for the proposition that the government may proscribe speech that ad-
vocates illegal action if and only if that speech meets the imminence
criterion, or conversely, that advocacy of illegal action is protected by the
First Amendment unless it meets the imminence criterion.134 The Supreme
Court seems to say this explicitly: the holding of Brandenburg is that "the
constitutional guarantees of free speech and free press do not permit a State
to forbid or proscribe advocacy of the use of force or of law violation
except where such advocacy is directed to inciting or producing imminent
lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."'
135
133. See Nockleby, supra note 56, at 658 (noting, for example, that courts "have strug-
gled to define the limits of racially-motivated intimidation or threats of violence").
134. See, e.g., Geoffrey R. Stone, Content-Neutral Restrictions, 54 U. Cmi. L. REv. 46,
47 n.4 (1987) ("Express incitement... may be suppressed only if it is 'directed to inciting
or producing imminent lawless action and is likely to incite or produce such action."').
135. Brandenburg, 395 U.S. at 447 (emphasis added).
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But this interpretation of Brandenburg is untenable. Recapping the
discussion above, the general or default rule is that content-based restric-
tions on speech are evaluated through application of the strict scrutiny test,
which almost invariably results in a finding that the restriction is unconsti-
tutional. 13 6 Certain categories of low-value speech may be regulated under
a more lenient standard. These categories include, for example: (1) speech
with sexual content that meets the Court's definition of "obscenity" articu-
lated in Miller v. California,'37 (2) advocacy of illegal action that satisfies
the Brandenburg imminence criterion, and (3) threats that meet the Watts
"true threat" standard. Figure 1 illustrates the First Amendment status of
these three categories of speech. The area inside the large circle represents
speech in general. The area inside the circle labeled A represents obscenity
as defined in Miller, circle B represents advocacy that meets the Branden-
burg test, and circle C represents true threats meeting the Watts test. Re-
strictions on speech in all three of these categories are upheld as long as
they do not inappropriately discriminate among viewpoints.
138
But what of (1) sexually oriented speech that is not obscene, (2) advo-
cacy of illegal conduct that is not likely to bring about such conduct immi-
nently, and (3) threats that a reasonable listener would not view as
seriously intended? In Figure 1, the area inside circle A' represents sexu-
ally oriented speech, which includes but is broader than the category of
obscenity. Likewise, circle B' represents advocacy of illegal conduct that
includes, but is not limited to, advocacy that meets the Brandenburg test,
and circle C' represents threats that may or may not meet the Watts test.
Thus, the ring between circles A and A' represents speech that is sexually
oriented but does not meet the Miller test for obscenity, the ring between
circles B and B' represents speech that advocates unlawful conduct but is
not likely to bring about such conduct imminently, and the ring between
circles C and C' represents threats that are not to be taken seriously. The
speech within these three rings does not fit in any of the categories of low-
value speech. Accordingly, content-based restrictions on these types of
speech will be evaluated according to the default criterion of strict scrutiny,
or some other applicable standard. So, for example, in FCC v. Pacifica
Foundation,'39 the Supreme Court upheld a restriction on speech that was
indecent but not obscene.'4 ° In so doing, it rejected the speaker's argument
136. See Stone, supra note 134, at 53. Restrictions on speech have occasionally with-
stood the withering glare of strict scrutiny. See Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Shield-
ing Children, and Transcending Balance, 1997 Sup. CT. REv. 141, 170-71.
137. 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
138. See R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 382-85.
139. 438 U.S. 726 (1978).
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Figure 1
"that inasmuch as the [speech] is not obscene, the Constitution forbids any
abridgment of the right to broadcast it on the radio." 141 In other words, the
Court rejected the claim that speech that shares some of the characteristics
of obscenity may be proscribed only if it meets the Miller definition of
obscenity. Meeting the Miller criterion is a sufficient basis for regulating
sexual speech, but it is not a necessary one.
In the same way, Brandenburg sets forth a criterion-"imminence '' -
that is sufficient to justify suppression of speech that advocates illegal con-
duct, but this criterion is not the only ground on which suppression of such
speech may be justified. For example, speech that advocates illegal con-
duct, but that is not likely to bring about such conduct imminently, would,
if it incorporates legally obscene utterances, 142 be proscribable under
Miller, despite the Court's pronouncement in Brandenburg that the govern-
ment may not forbid advocacy of illegal conduct "except where" imminent
141. FCC v. Pacifica, 438 U.S. at 742.
142. Represented by point Q on Figure 1.
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illegal conduct is likely. To be consistent with the methodology of defini-
tional balancing, the Court's holding in Brandenburg must be read as set-
ting forth a sufficient condition for finding advocacy of illegal action to be
unprotected, but not a necessary one.
Thus, Brandenburg poses no impediment to a rule that applies cate-
gorical balancing to menacing speech-despite the fact that such speech
takes the form of advocacy of illegal conduct. Just as Brandenburg would
not prevent the government from prohibiting menacing speech on the
ground that it is obscene, or that it meets the strict scrutiny test, neither
would it be offended by treating menacing speech categorically as disfa-
vored low-value speech. We might rationalize the seemingly contrary ex-
pression of Brandenburg's holding by interpolating a limiting phrase, so
that it would be understood as if it read: "the constitutional guarantees of
free speech and free press do not permit a State to forbid or proscribe
advocacy of the use of force or of law violation, [on the ground that such
advocacy may result in such use of force or law violation,] except where"
the imminence requirement is met.14 3
The newly defined category of unprotected menacing speech would
occupy the circle labeled D in Figure 1. Located in the ring between cir-
cles A and A', circle D represents a functional subset of speech that for-
mally advocates illegal action but does not satisfy the Brandenburg
imminence test.
2. Relaxing the Brandenburg imminence requirement
An alternative approach to implementing the proposed unprotected
status of menacing speech would require a modification of Brandenburg.
The Supreme Court could relax Brandenburg's imminence requirement,
either eliminating the requirement of temporal proximity or replacing it
with a degree-of-harm factor. The modified Brandenburg criterion could
take several forms. One possible modified version: the government may
prohibit advocacy of illegal action if such advocacy is (1) directed to incit-
ing lawless action (at some unspecified point in the future) and is likely to
incite such action (at some unspecified point in the future), and (2) the
advocated action is the infliction of violence upon a specified individual or
143. The Court comes close to this formulation of the Brandenburg test in Hess v. Indi-
ana, 414 U.S. 105, 109 (1973) (per curiam): "[S]ince there was no evidence or rational
inference from the import of the language, that [defendant's] words were intended to pro-
duce, and likely to produce, imminent disorder, those words could not be punished by the
State on the ground that they had 'a tendency to lead to violence."' (quoting the decision
below, 297 N.E.2d 413, 415 (Ind. 1973)).
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Figure 2
small group of individuals. 1" This modification of First Amendment doc-
trine is represented on Figure 2 as area E. Area E encloses the same speech
that is within circle D on Figure 1, but does so by pushing out the boundary
of circle B rather than by defining a wholly new category. E is a bulge,
while D is an island.
This approach is subject to several varieties of criticism. First, it is
problematic from the standpoint of administrability. Eliminating the tem-
poral proximity criterion for advocacy of murder would require plaintiffs to
prove that it is likely that someone in a mass audience will be persuaded by
the message, despite unconstrained opportunities for counterspeech, to take
144. Cass Sunstein has tentatively proposed a similar modification of Brandenburg. He
suggests that, in view of the ease with which modem communications technologies allow
incendiary speech to be transmitted to an audience numbering in the millions, it may be
appropriate to loosen Brandenburg's imminence requirement, at least "[w]hen messages
advocating murderous violence are sent to large numbers of people." See Cass R. Sunstein,
Constitutional Caution, 1996 U. Cm. LEcAL F. 361, 370-71.
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murderous action at some point in the future. It is not at all clear what sort
of evidence would suffice here; due to the possibility that any number of
intervening events might break the chain of causation, this burden is very
different from proving that speech is likely to have an immediate effect of
incitement to illegal action. By contrast, the other two approaches to mak-
ing menacing speech unprotected-creating a new disfavored category
covering menacing speech, as discussed above, and reformulating the test
for a true threat, as discussed below-focus on the reasonableness of the
target's apprehension of fear rather than the likelihood that the advocacy
will be persuasive. It seems far less difficult to evaluate evidence that the
target of murderous advocacy will reasonably feel threatened when such
speech is broadcast to millions of recipients than to evaluate evidence that
at least one of those recipients is likely to engage in the advocated action.
The second problem with this approach is that the rationale for mov-
ing away from the "persuasion principle," though initially limited to speech
advocating murder or other serious crimes, would be difficult to confine to
that circumstance. Many aspects of First Amendment law depend on the
assumption-unrealistic though it may be-that counterspeech will van-
quish harmful speech.145 If that assumption is rejected in the present con-
text based on practical considerations, the same considerations might lead
to its rejection elsewhere as well, leading to a serious erosion of the consti-
tutional protection accorded unpopular speech.
3. Reformulating the "true threat" criterion
Alternatively, we might modify the lower courts' formulations of the
test for a "true threat," removing the formalistic requirement that the gov-
ernment may restrict only those threatening statements that express the
speaker's intent to inflict harm. It would be difficult to illustrate this modi-
fication using diagrams like Figures 1 and 2 because the circles in those
diagrams represent speech that is defined formally rather than functionally.
Conceptually, this modification calls for treating the speech within circle D
(or area E) as though it were located in circle C, given the functional simi-
larity between menacing speech and threats.
Nothing in Watts requires that the category of "true threats" be limited
to expressions of the speaker's own intent. How "true" a threat is-that is,
its propensity to frighten and disrupt the lives of reasonable targets-does
not depend on the form of words that is used. The test that the lower courts
have formulated, limiting the category to those utterances in which the
145. See Strauss, supra note 30, at 346-53 (discussing consequentialist justifications for
the persuasion principle that rely on the remedy of more speech to counteract harmful
speech).
1999]
Texas Journal of Women and the Law
speaker expresses her intention to inflict harm, results from the coincidence
that most threatening utterances in fact take that form. This is true, in
particular, of the cases in which the courts of appeals fashioned the formu-
lations of the "true threat" criterion that are employed by all the circuits. 46
On the whole, enlarging the true-threats category seems to be the best
means of implementing the proposal that menacing speech should be eval-
uated categorically for First Amendment purposes. It is least disruptive of
current doctrine, requiring only a reformulation of the test that the lower
courts have fashioned to implement the principles that the Supreme Court
set forth in Watts. It would not have major repercussions in other areas of
First Amendment doctrine, unlike a modification of the Brandenburg im-
minence requirement. Although this approach would have the same practi-
cal effect as designating menacing speech as a new category of low-value
speech, it is conceptually tidier than creating a new category, and has the
advantage of emphasizing the close functional connection between menac-
ing speech and threats.
D. Application of the Proposed Rule
We may expect to encounter relatively few instances of menacing
speech. Most speech that advocates unlawful conduct will not qualify as
menacing speech. For one thing, to be menacing a statement must advo-
cate violence. So, for example, urging a mob to sit down in the street,
blocking the governor's motorcade, is not menacing. Furthermore, advo-
cacy of violent illegal action must be sufficiently targeted to give rise to
reasonable fear. Thus, urging a small audience to go to downtown Chicago
and punch someone in the nose at random is not menacing. Speech must
stray a considerable distance from the political discourse that is at the
"core" of the First Amendment147 before it will qualify as menacing.1 48
146. See United States v. Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d Cir. 1976); United States v.
Maisonet, 484 F.2d 1356 (4th Cir. 1973); Roy v. United States, 416 F.2d 874 (9th Cir.
1969).
147. See SuNsrEN, DEMOCRACY, supra note 4, at 9.
148. Examples of speech that the courts have found protected under the Brandenburg
test, and that would remain protected under the proposal of this article, include: speech that
"'fosters or promotes a lifestyle or actions prohibited by the sodomy and sexual misconduct
laws,"' see Gay Lesbian Bisexual Alliance v. Pryor, 110 F.3d 1543, 1548 (1 1th Cir. 1997)
(citing ALA. CODE § 16-1-28); a discussion of autoerotic asphyxia in a magazine article, see
Herceg v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 814 F.2d 1017, 1018 (5th Cir. 1987); an advertisement by
an anti-draft organization offering information on rights and options with respect to the
draft, see San Diego Committee Against Registration and the Draft v. Governing Bd. of
Grossmont Union High Sch. Dist., 790 F.2d 1471, 1472 (9th Cir. 1986); symbolic speech of
Nazis marching in Skokie, Illinois, see Collin v. Smith, 578 F.2d 1197, 1198 (7th Cir.
1978); and song lyrics presenting suicide as a viable option, see Waller v. Osboume, 763 F.
Supp. 1144, 1146 (M.D. Ga. 1991). The proposal would also not disturb the First Amend-
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As with threats, the test for menacing speech will be multi-factor and
highly contextual. Factors supporting a determination that a statement is
menacing will include:
The specificity with which the intended victims are identified. 4 9 Urg-
ing violence against a particular named individual, or a group of named
individuals, presents the clearest case. The most menacing version of this
advocacy will include personally identifying information about the target
such as her picture, home or work address, or a description of her car. If
the advocacy targets a relatively small group that is defined by status or
affiliation rather than by name, a conclusion that the speech is menacing
may still be appropriate. 5 ' Advocacy of violence against a very large
group is unlikely to support a finding that the speech is menacing. Thus,
advocacy of violence against specific, named abortion providers will pro-
vide a stronger case for restriction than advocacy of violence against abor-
tion providers in general. A rather weak case would be presented by
advocacy of violence against "supporters of abortion."
The reactions of the listeners.' As with threats, the actual reactions
of the recipients of the speech (whether the intended victims or third par-
ties) can help to establish that speech is menacing. The fact that the in-
tended victims react by taking defensive actions (at some cost to
themselves), or that law enforcement officials react by offering to protect
the intended victims, tends to support a finding that the speech is
menacing.
The degree of vituperation that the speech directs at the intended vic-
tims. Listeners are more likely to inflict harm on the intended victims if
they believe the victims are deserving of that treatment. Characterizing the
ment limitations on liability predicated upon offensive speech. See Hustler Magazine, Inc.
v. Falwell, 485 U.S. 46, 52-53 (1988) (applying "actual malice" standard to claims based on
intentional infliction of emotional distress); Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 867 F.2d
1188, 1195 (9th Cir. 1989) (applying "actual malice" standard to defamation claim).
149. Of the various implementations of the Watts decision in different circuits, only the
Second Circuit makes this criterion an explicit element of the test. See United States v.
Kelner, 534 F.2d 1020 (2d. Cir. 1976), discussed supra note 45. In the other circuits, it may
be taken into account as one of the contextual factors.
150. A parallel rule exists in the law of defamation. A defamatory statement concerning
a group or class of individuals is actionable by an individual member only if "the group or
class is so small that the matter can reasonably be understood to refer to the member."
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 564A. See also FOWLER V. HARPER ET AL., THE LAW
OF TORTS (2d ed. 1986), § 5.7 at 58-61.
151. Listener reaction is a standard contextual factor in the existing "true threat" analy-
sis. See, e.g., Watts v. United States, 394 U.S. 705, 707 (1969) (per curiam) (noting that
"both petitioner and the crowd laughed after the statement was made"); United States v.
Hoffman, 806 F.2d 703, 712 (7th Cir. 1986) (relying on reactions of mailroom employee
and Secret Service in response to threatening letter addressed to the president).
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intended victims as Nazis, mass murderers, fascists, or racists, or using
other terms that connote evil given the cultural context, helps to persuade
listeners that violent action is appropriate.
The likelihood that the audience will be receptive to the message. If
the audience is a defined group, its composition will be a factor affecting
the likelihood that the advocacy will be persuasive. Calling for "Death to
abortionists" at a pro-life rally is more likely to be found menacing than
doing the same at a convention of the National Abortion and Reproductive
Rights Action League.
The cultural and historical context. "Death to the Tutsis" might be
menacing in contemporary Rwanda, but not in the United States. The op-
posite might be true of "Death to abortionists." Whether a statement is
menacing may change over time within a single culture. "Death to abor-
tionists" might not have been perceived as menacing in this country prior
to the decision of Roe v. Wade.
152
The breadth of dissemination of the speech. A statement advocating
violence is more likely to be menacing if it is posted in a publicly available
forum on the Internet (for example, on a Web site or in a newsgroup) than
if it is made to a few individuals on a street comer. The larger and less
well-defined the audience, the less confident the target is able to be that no
listener will find the advocacy persuasive, and therefore the more reason-
able the target's fear.
Each of these factors may make it more or less reasonable for the
targets to conclude that the advocated action may occur, resulting in the
fear and disruption usually associated with threats. No single factor will be
dispositive. As with any multi-factor test, evaluating all the relevant fac-
tors and deriving a conclusion will in many cases be quite difficult.
V. Conclusion
This argument of this article has been that the test for whether a state-
ment may be regulated as a threat should not depend on whether the state-
ment reflects the formal structure of a threat, but rather on whether it
results in the harms usually associated with threats. The proposed treat-
ment of menacing speech is consistent with both Brandenburg and Watts,
but would require a reformulation of the test that the lower courts have
devised to implement the "true threat" criterion set forth in Watts.
Although the argument presented in the article does not depend on the
medium by which speech is communicated, it may be seen as having
greater relevance to speech communicated via the Internet than to speech
152. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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transmitted through other media. We might distinguish two different
routes by which online speech may become subject to rules different from
those that apply to speech transmitted via the older communications media:
the direct route and the disparate-impact route. The direct route consists of
devising a new rule that responds to the novel aspects of the new medium.
The disparate-impact route, by contrast, involves devising a new rule, or
retaining an existing one, that ostensibly is to be applied even-handedly
regardless of the communications medium involved. Because of differ-
ences among the various communications media, however, the practical
consequences of the rule may vary significantly depending on the medium.
Because communication via the Internet may enable fringe opinions
to reach a vastly larger audience, at vastly lower cost, than any other me-
dium of communication, the proposed rule may be expected to have a dis-
parate impact on Internet communications. The online medium currently
reaches around 150 million people15 3-an audience somewhat larger than
the television viewership of a recent Super Bowl.'5 4 But a one-minute
Super Bowl pitch would cost $3.2 million,' 5 5 as compared to a cost of
about $19.95 a month to put up a Web site. Of course, these numbers are
not strictly comparable, since only a small fraction of the potential viewer-
ship will "tune in" to any given Web site. On the other hand, many Super
Bowl viewers are known to visit the refrigerator or the bathroom during
commercial breaks; the amount of content that can be placed on a Web site
is incomparably more than what can be squeezed into a one-minute com-
mercial; and speech on a Web site is persistent whereas broadcast speech is
ephemeral.
Even if she had the cash, a fringe speaker might still be unable to get
her message out to a mass audience through any medium other than the
Internet. Mainstream media outlets exercise tight control over the content
of commercial messages that they will distribute. For example, the net-
work television broadcasters in the United States have developed elaborate
sets of standards that they use in evaluating the suitability of a proposed
advertisement, and they refuse to air advertisements that do not conform to
those standards. 156 It might be difficult to find a mainstream media outlet
153. See James Ledbetter, Making a Global Web Audience Count, INDusTRY STANDARD,
Mar. 11, 1999, <http://www.thestandard.net> (citing estimate of nearly 148 million Internet
users at year-end 1998).
154. Super Bowl XXXIII, televised in January 1999, drew 127.5 million viewers. See
Stuart Elliott, At $1.6 Million for 30 Seconds, Few Commercials Proved Worthy of Their
Super Bowl Spotlight, N.Y. Tmvms, Feb. 2, 1999, at C10.
155. See id.
156. See GORDON E. MIRACLE & TERENCE NavErr, VOLUNTARY REGULATION OF AD-
VERTISiNG 139-41 (1987) (describing the standards applied by ABC, CBS, and NBC).
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that reaches a large audience that would agree to publish the content of the
Nuremberg Files Web site. The Internet presents no such content
filtering.
157
Until the advent of the Internet those who aimed at incitement of this
sort were likely to be confined to means of communication that reach a
limited audience,' 58 and their speech was in that respect less dangerous.
The proposed rule is therefore more likely to come into play with respect to
speech communicated via the Internet than with speech transmitted by the
older communications media, and it may be viewed as an example of the
disparate-impact route to applying different rules to a new communications
medium.
But there is another way of looking at the speech involved in Planned
Parenthood. While speech that threatens without taking the form of a
threat is most likely to be communicated via the Internet, it may also ap-
pear on the older communications media. It is possible, for example, for
speech of the sort that appeared on the Nuremberg Files Web site to be
communicated on a television talk show, reaching a wide audience.159
However, speech of this type is less likely to have occurred in any widely
disseminated medium while television broadcasting was tightly controlled
by three networks with relatively high standards for what was allowed to
be said on the air. The evolution of the television medium has occurred
incrementally over the past few decades, through the addition of many
cable channels and the lowering of the filtering function exercised by
broadcasters. This evolution has caused a gradual democratization of the
157. The operator of a white-supremacist Web site called "Stormfront" is well aware of
this feature: "We are able to reach millions of people that we never had access to in the
past.... The Internet is becoming an alternative new media for those who have an alterna-
tive point of view." Patti Hartigan, Internet Civil Rights Wars Renew Free Speech Issues,
BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1998, at A7. See Eugene Volokh, Cheap Speech and What It Will
Do, 104 YALE L.J. 1805, 1837 (1995) (noting that the Internet reduces the power of speech
intermediaries).
158. See, e.g., Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 618 (1919) (distribution of leaflets
voicing revolutionary sentiments by tossing them out the window of an office building and
handing them out at clandestine meetings); Debs v. United States, 249 U.S. 211 (1919)
(speech before a live audience).
159. See Lucero v. Trosch, 928 F. Supp. 1124, 1127 (S.D. Ala. 1996). The case was the
aftermath of an episode of the "Geraldo Show," in which the guests were a doctor who
performed abortions and an outspoken advocate of the view that the killing of abortion
providers is justifiable homicide. The latter was allowed to express his views in rather
inflammatory terms-including stating that the doctor "is a mass murderer and ... should
be dead," and that he "would approve of the killing." The doctor brought an action against
him under the Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act, 18 U.S.C. § 248. The court,
analyzing the statements in context, concluded that they did not amount to "threats of
force," but did caution that its decision was "heavily influenced by the specific circum-
stances surrounding [the anti-abortion advocate's] remarks." Id. at 1131.
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channels (in the broad sense) for communication of messages to broad
audiences. The Internet may be viewed as the culmination of this democ-
ratization process-the price of entry is reduced to the cost of a computer,
Internet access, and minimal technical competence. The current salience of
online communications may therefore help us to recognize the incremental
changes that have occurred in the older communications media, and a mod-
ification of First Amendment doctrine that seems necessitated by the novel
characteristics of online communications may be recognized as an overdue
modification of the doctrine applying to all media.
